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FLUCTUATION IN LEATHER BUYING OF SHOE MANUFACTURERS:
HYPOTHESIS AND TEST
We try now to appraise the net influence of the many
factors found at work on the temporal patterns of buy-
ing and its relation to selling in shoe factories. By com-
paring these patterns with series representing causal
influences, we can gain some general notion of whether
the data contradict the explanation. Here, again, it may
be that the tests themselves will help to frame more
penetrating questions.
A Hypothesis on the Behavior of Leather Stocks
First, which intentions with respect to the stocks
can be validated and which of them are likely to be
thwarted in the course of unfolding events? The inten-
tions linking the physical volume of buying and that of
selling are capable of approximate achieve-
ment because so substantial a portion of actual orders
are on hand before leather must be purchased. Inten-
tions, then, rather than inevitable error, as in the case
of the retailer, will be the primary factor determining
the patterns of shoe manufacturers' leather stocks. Only
in connection with the aspect of buying that depends
on guesses about market conditions must disappoint-
ment frequently occur, and for this aspect we need
notdistinguish between thwartedintentions and
changed intentions.
To see how much of the behavior of stocks may be
explained, we combine the results of our analysis of
leather buying under stable market prospects and buy-
ing based on shifting market prospects and arrive at a
model that we hope to put to an empirical test. Under
constant market prospects, leather stocks of leather-
goods manufacturers are expected to bear a positive
and either slightly leading or synchronous association
with leather consumption. Shifting market prospects
presumably cause inventories of leather on hand and on
order to have a positive association both with the rate
of change in expected leather prices and with the as-
surance with which optimistic or pessimistic expecta-
tions are held. The amplitude of fluctuations in stock
on hand and on order will tend to approach upper
and lower limits dictated by altered risks. Whether
operating margins exhibit some association with the
process requires investigation.
Evidence Bearing on Each of the Ma/or Variables
Chart 25 shows the estimates of cattle-hidø leather
stocks held by manufacturers and other time series rep-
resenting factors that may be partly responsible for the
course stocks followed. The data on stocks ware com-
puted by estimating the cattle-hide leather usød in the
production of the month's output of shoes. These fig-
ures were subtracted from shipments of cattle-hide
leather from tanneries (after deduction of net exports)
to obtain the change in cattle-hide inventories of
leather-goods manufacturers (leather dealers' inven-
tories are implicitly included), and these hypothetical
changes in stocks were linked to a base figure. Esti-
mates of this sort are always highly fallible, since a
small percentage error in either of the two flow series'
can cause large percentage errors in the diilEerences,
which in turn are cumulated in stocks proper.
Conceptual as well as statistical difficulties arise in
representing the activities to be explained by data on
leather stock and its rate of change. First, a minor one:
The logic applies to the number of weeks' supply on
hand rather than to actual stocks. The precise Irneaning
of the former concept may well vary, but certainly it is
not a ratio between stocks at the beginning orendof
the week and the week's sales. The sales form-
ing the denominator of the ratio is probably more often
than not some sort of average for a season or two, or
even planned rather than actual sales; consequently,
the time patterns of the two concepts, number of weeks'
supply on hand and total stocks, are not too &fferent,
at least for the short periods involved in subcycles.
The second difficulty is serious. The hypothesis ap-
plies to ownership position (leather stocks on hand and
on order). The statistical data apply to stock on hand
only. They ignore outstanding orders for leather,
1Onesource of error threatens the accuracy of tinxing com-
parisons. In estimating leather consumption, a ratio wcs applied
to shoe production that purported to show the changing amount
of cattle hide used in a pair of shoes. The ratio has amarked
downward trend, 1922—1940, and the presence oftrend is
indicated by other information. Its extent may, however, be
overestimated. If so, the downward trend in stocks will also be
exaggerated. Among other things, this might cause a tendency
for peaks in stocks to be marked early and troughs late relative




















































































































































































































































whether a blanket order or one with type and color
specified; this information is essential to an accurate
portrayal of shoe manufacturers' market position and
of how it changes. But although the level of the market
position is not indicated by information on stock on
hand only, its change, at least the direction of its
change, may be. Market extension or contraction based
on changing market prospects may take the form, in
part, of spot purchases of leather. Even if it does not,
an allowance for a delivery interval may make it
possible for data on stock to indicate, though some-
what tardily (especially at peaks), how market posi-.
tions are changing.
VOLUME OF BUYING
Shoe manufacturers, acting according to their own
foreknowledge of production schedules as conveyed
through their customers' orders, plan to have leather in
the factory in time to prepare it for processing and to
complete the shoes at the appointed time. Therefore
under constant market prospects, change in leather
consumption should be reflected in stock, probably
with a short lead. On the average, Table 44 shows
about as many leads as lags of consumption relative
to stocks. But the average obscures a strong tendency
to lead at troughs and lag at This suggests
a link between the size of stocks and orders for shoes:
at peaks, when advance positions were extended, orders
turned down several months before the change was re-
flected in production schedules; at troughs, the lag was
greatly reduced. Asymmetry is suggested also in the
association of wholesale sales of shoes and the con-
sumption of cattle-hide leather, for which only 21 per
cent of the months are in unlike phase. But synchro-
nous relationships predominate at troughs (they occur
at 7 of the 13 troughs), whereas at peaks wholesale
sales lead in 9 out of 13 opportunities.3 These figures
parallel the figures for wholesale sales and shoe pro-
duction cited earlier. In general, I conclude that the
timing association of stocks and output is not contrary
to expectations.
However, the two sets of data do not show the strong
general similarity that would suggest output was a
major determinant of stocks. Beginning around 1926,
by which time the excess stock of World War I had
been worked off, stocks and output seem to have
2 indexof consistency with which peaks lag more or lead
less than troughs is +79. This asymmetrical timing association
also exists between shoe production and stocks; for these two
series the consistency index is +74. This suggests that the statis-
tical peculiarities of leather consumption (see the previous note)
are not the controlling factor.
The index of consistency for differential peak and trough
timing for wholesale sales (pairs) and leather consumption is 40.
The average lead of wholesale sales is 1.4 at peaks and 0.5 at
troughs.
broadly parallel trends, at least until 1938, when eccen-
tricities appear in the data. Subcycles, however, have a
very different course. Differences in amplitude cause
the output-stock ratio to be sharply inverse to, and syn-
chronous with, subcycles in stocks. Furthermore, stocks
and output move in opposite subcyclical phases 38 per
cent of the time between the end of 1921 and
The underlying influence of output on stock might be
clearer in first differences than in the cumulated data.
Such an association, after an adjustment for the ex-
pected lead of stocks, would permit an intended in-
cremental sales-stock ratio to differ from the average
ratio; it is thus a more general case than the previous
one. But the two series, shown in Chart 26, exhibit few
similarities, and Table 45confirmsthe visual impres-
sion—38 per cent of the months are in unlike phase.5
EXPECTATIONS CONCERNING PRICES
At least one strand of the highly complex web of ob-
servations and experiences on which expectations about
prices are based must be the relation of current prices
to past prices. Past prices and their rates of chimge are
not only specifically watched as harbingers of future
prices, but they doubtless also reflect the impact of
other sorts of evidence on buyers and sellers—direct
experiences of market conditions encountered in the
course of a business day. If so, their pattern may be
doubly relevant, once for itself and once for a group of
other invisible factors that shape judgments about the
future, including the future of prices.
Recent rates of change of prices may be as good a
measure as we can find of the expected rate of change
in prices which will form a basis for the judgment on
the amount to be gained from altering the number of
weeks' supply of leather, or the supply on hand and on
order. The level of stock (or its ratio to output) should
respond to the rate of change in prices insofar as the
absolute guess about future prices (rather idian the
firmness or the dispersion of opinion) is the active
agent. Since the synchronous association will presum-
ably be between month-to-month change iii prices
and stocks proper on hand and on order, change in
With an allowance for a one-month lead of consumption, the
figure is 37. An allowance for a lead of three months at troughs
and none at peaks reduces it to 31.
The lead of consumption at troughs relative to peaks found
in the cumulated data is not present in the first differences since
first differences in stocks lead stocks proper by considerably more
at troughs than at peaks (the association of first differences in
consumption to consumption proper is substantially similar at
peaks and troughs). This might imply, if we persist in assuming
that orders for shoes lead leather consumption by more at peaks
than troughs, that stocks begin to slacken their rate of rise about
when orders cease to rise (and first differences in consumption
reach their peak), and that stocks begin to fall at a less rapid rate
a few months, on the average, before either orders or consump-
tion turn up, though after their rate of decline has slowed156 CHAPTER12
TABLE 44
Timing of Subcycles: Leather-Goods Manufacturers' Leather Stocks Compared with Selected Data, 1922—1940
Series 75 in Appendix B.
b For the rules used in matching subcycle turns, see Appendix
A, secs. lOa, b, c, and d. See also Appendix A, sec. I.
See Appendix A, sec. 11.
d See Appendix A, sec. 14.
eFromthe timing at each peak is subtracted the timing at the
previous and following trough. Each time the sign of the differ-
ence accords with that of the difference between the average
peakand trough timing, +100 is set down; each time it differs,
—100; and if it is the same, zero. The ratings are then summed
and divided by the number of comparisons (see Appendix A,
sec. Jib, ¶4).
The first differences arc five-month moving averages of
month-to-month change, stated in the last month in the case of
hides, centered in the case of manufacturers' leather stocks.
gTheassociation is inverse; thus, specific peaks are matched
with reference troughs and specific troughs with reference peaks.
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2621 11 9 1 —1.7—1.21.9 1.8 +79 —1 37
2727 5 16 6+1.0+1.0 1.5 1.5 +42 +1 22
3025 9 6 10 0+0.1 1.4 1.4 +48 0 25
Hide prices (23)
Manufacturers' leather
352920 1 8 0 —1.61.6 1.5 +31 —1 28
stocks (74)
Ratio (87) of leather con-
313128 0 3 —2.3—3.32.0 1.8 +70 —3 25
sumption to manufactur-




and labor cost; matched






2424 10 12 2+0.5+0.1 1.9 1.9 +26 0 25








NUMBER Lag (+)of: NUMBER Mean Lead (—)
OFMATCHED PEAKS Cen- Aver- OF MATCHED TROUGHS or Lag (+)of:
-Aver-
Syn-tral age Syn-Central age
Lead- Lag- chro-3 or 4AllDevia- Lead- Lag- chro-3 or4 AllDevia-






11 3 7 1+1.3 +0.41.7 10 8 2 0 —3.5 —2.9 1.9
13 1102+1.3 +1.71.4 14 4 6 4 +0.2+0.4 1.6.
13 2 56 0+1.01.8 12 7 1 4 —0.8 —0.9 0.9
Hide prices
Manufacturers' leather stocks
14 9 14 —1.0 —1.11.3 15 11 0 4 —1.3 —2.1 1.7
15 12 03—2.0 —1.91.0 18 16 0 0 —4.0 —4.62.2
Ratio of leather consumption
to manufacturers' stocks;
matched inversely
Margin over leather (LIFO)
and labor cost; matched




12 5 70+0.5 +0.21.9 12 5 5 2 0 —0.1 1.9
11 3 7 1+1.0 +0.51.5 11 4 5 2 +0.3+0.3 1.7MANUFACTURERS' BUYING—2 157
TABLE45
Timing of Subcycles: Leather-Goods Manufacturers' Inventory Investment in Leather Compared with Selected Data, 1922—1940
a Series 74 in Appendix B; turns are marked in centered five.
month moving average of month-to-month change.
b For the rules used in matching subcycle turns, see Appendix
A, sees. lOa, b, c, and d.
See Appendix A, sec. 11.
d See Appendix A, sec. 14.
e See Table 44, note e, or Appendix A, Sec. fib, ¶4.







Peak NUMBER OF TURNS b Mean Lead (—) AverageDevia- and That
Matched Turns or Lag(+) of: tion from: Trough Correspondence
Syn-Central Mean Mean forTiming Lead (—)
All Lead- Lag- chro-3 or 4Allof All Peaks and Consistencyor Lag (4-)
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Wholesale shoe sales, dol-
2822 9 11 2+0.7—0.62.8 2.6 +29 0 38
2524 5 15 4+1.0+1.91.8 1.7 +35 +1 27
3531 15 5 11 —0.5—0.5 1.6 1.6 +58 0 25
.
lars (84)
1 3125 13 7 5 —1.0—1.0 1.8 1.8 +9 —1 30




and labor cost per pair
(10)
,
322523 2 0 —3.0—2.71.4 1.3 +29 —3 27
.






Lead (—)or TIMING (months) C
NUMBER Lag (+)of: NUMBER Mean Lead (—)
OFMATCHED PEAKS Ceo- Aver- OF MATCHED TROUGHS or Lag (+)of:Aver-
Syn-tral age Syn-Central age
Lead- Lag- chro-3 or 4AllDevia- LeaS- Lag- chro-3 or 4 AllDevia-






Wholesale shoe sales, dollars
.11 5 5 1—0.3 —0.92.4 11 4 6 1 +0.7 —0.4 2.8
12 4 53+0.2 —0.11.4 12 1 10 1 +1.8+2.2 2.0
15 10 14—1.0 —1.51.4 16 5 4 7 0 +0.4 1.7
12 8 3 1 —1.5 —1.42.1 13 5 4 4 0 —0.7 1.5
Ratio of leather conlsumption
to manufacturers' stocks 12 12 00—3.0 —8.00.5 13 11 2 0 —2.3 —2.4 2.0
Margin over (LIFO)
and labor cost per pair 8 8 00—3.0 —8.81.7 8 7 0 1 —2.3 —3.5 2.8
The firstdifferences are five-month moving averages of
month-to-month change.
gIfthe comparison is made on an inverted basis, twenty-seven
turns are matched by our timing rules, and the mean lag+2.6.
But the relation is more irregular as indicated by the average
deviation of 2.3 months.158 CHAPTER 12
CHART26












Specifuc-subcycle peaks and troughs (broken and solid vertical lines) inventory investment in leather (in a centered five-month average of month-to-month
differences in cattle-hide leather stacks of leather-goods manufacturers, series 74 in Appendix B) are used as reference frame.
For the other series, specific-subcycle turns are marked by 0. When a specific turn is matched with a turn in the reference series, a horizontalline or
vertical arrow indicates the association.
First differences are centered five-month moving averages of month-to-month change.
prices may be expected to lead stocks on hand by a
brief interval.
Prices proper may mirror the gradually cumulating
force of optimistic or pessimistic expectation in the
market—the firmness with which expectations of rising
or falling prices are held and the extent of their dis-
persion throughout the market. A contrary force may
be reflected by the absolute height of the figures:
marketeers, familiar with a range within which prices
normally fluctuate, may start to expect a fall as the up-
per boundaries of the range are approached and a rise
as prices fall toward levels known to be low in an abso-
lute sense. But absolute lows and highs occur rela-
lively seldom. We can watch for evidence of such be-
havior, but the primary and systematic association to
be expected for prices proper and shoe manufacturers'
stocks of leather is probably a direct one reflecting
the cumulating sentiments about market prospects.
The expected timing association will link current prices
with the level of stocks currently (or presently) on
hand (and on order )-Thiswould mean that prices are
associated with stocks on hand either synchronously
or with a slight lead.
If the rate of change of prices reflects the size of ex-
pected price change, and the price level reflects the














































factors are important determinants of buying, then
stocks on hand and on order may be expected to exhibit
the combined pattern of prices and their first differ-
ences (inventory investment the pattern of first and sec-
ond differences in prices). Stocks on hand only may or
may not show this pattern. To say whether they do or
not, we turn to the charts and look for a reflection first
of prices and then of first differences in prices. While
studying each separately, it is well to remember what
the logic of the association dictates as the net timing
relation between stocks and prices. Stocks should syn-
chronize with or lag slightly both prices and their first
differences. Since turns in first differences in prices lead
prices proper, the influence of the price guess (repre-
sented in part by first differences) will cause turns in
stocks to be earlier than turns in prices (representing
the influence of the cumulation of confidence). The
more important the first influence, the nearer stocks
will draw toward an average lead of a few months over
prices proper, other things the same.
But, unfortunately, other things cannot possibly be
the same. The causal association between leather prices
and stocks of leather held by leather-goods manufac-
turers can hardly run simply from prices (as a represen-
tation of expected prices) to stocks. Efforts of buyers
to accumulate stocks must presently influence the
course of prices. The extent of the impact on prices or
on their rate of change would perhaps be most ac-
curately represented by the rate of change in stocks
(more particularly in ownership position). Change in
ownership position may lead changes in stocks, es-
pecially at peaks, but certainly would not lag. Con-
sequently this line of causal connection seems more
consistent with synchronous or even lagging turns in
stocks relative to prices (especially at peaks) than with
leading ones. Nevertheless the empirical data are hard
put to determine which set of impacts they reflect.
This difficulty cannot, so far as I know, be abolished.
Details of timing comparisons can help a little. Also,
it is best to select the price statistics less likely than
some alternative to be affected by leather buying and
more likely than an alternative to reflect expected prices
or the weight of market sentiment. Accordingly, we
rely primarily on hide prices. Because the price of
hides is a highly important element in leather costs
(and a change in hide prices a still more important
element), it seems reasonable to suppose that expecta-
tions about leather prices reflect present hide prices
and their expected prices.
Fortunately, the argument does not depend on the
ability to distinguish between the causal link that runs
in each of the two directions—from stocks to prices and
from prices (via expectations) to stocks. Chapter 15
will indicate quite clearly that the first direction of
association constitutes one of the strands bearing on
prices. The picture may be interpreted in terms of
shifting demand schedules for hides caused by chang-
ing willingness, all along the line, to hold stocks on
hand and on order. This, in connection with an upward-
sloping supply schedule for hides, causes changes in
market prices. But how do these shifts occur? Ob-
viously, if the desired change in stocks is than
is necessitated by the physical requirements of cus-
tomers' orders, it must reflect other
among which are changed market prospects. Though
in reviewing the evidence, it is well to try to identify
which type of association between stocks and prices
seems to be reflected, the effort to distinguish them
neither can, nor ought to be, pushed uncomfortably
far. If there is any temporal association between the
two sets of data, it must, under the conditions
in in both directions. Onlyrela-
tive importance of each requires further investigation.
A general similarity between the course of leather
prices and that of leather inventories appears clearly
in Chart 25; the same statement (somewhat more
clearly in the early years, less in the later years) ap-
plies to hide prices. Table 44 gives the timing associa-
tions relative to leather stock: an average lag of one
month for leather prices and a synchronous relation for
hide prices. The table indicates that for hide prices 25
per cent of the months are in unlike phase and for
leather prices the corresponding figure (after adjust-
ment for the typical lag of one month) is 22 per cent.
The same set of relationships may be studied tn the
first difference series of Chart 26 and Table 45. Again
there is a small lag for change in leather and
this time a small lead for change in hide prices relative
to inventory investment, though the per cent of months
in unlike phase is somewhat larger than before (27 per
cent for leather prices and 25 per cent for hide prices ).°
°Prices,like consumption, tend to lead stocks by mOre at
troughs than peaks. Here, too, the asymmetry is reversed in the
first difference series. An explanation for this behavior niay be
that at troughs, shifts in the weight of opinion in the market
are immediately manifest in changes in stocks, since orders can
be delivered in a very short time; at peaks, a drop in new ørders
may take a while to be registered in supplies on hand. However,
the rate at which stocks are increasing may fall off after optimistic
market sentiment has started to wane, though stocks themselves
conthiue to rise, since of the two factors making for a rise in
stock—increasing deliveries of past orders and increasing de-
liveries of new at-once orders—the second has started to fall. But
at troughs the two factors are not differentiated, and thus the
impact of the tempo of change on market sentiment and thence
on inventory investment is swift.
Viewed as evidence of reverse causal association, that cf the
impact of stocks on prices, first differences in stocks should be
the critical statistic, reflecting changes in buying. On the as-
sumption that changes in ownership position lead change in stock
more at peaks than troughs, first differences in prices and prices
proper (it is hard to say which would be more appropriate)
should lead stocks at peaks and synchronize or lag slightly at160 CHAPTER 12
First differences in prices should, according to our
hypothesis, have an association with stocks proper (or
their ratio to output). The influence would operate
through the influence of recent rates of change of prices
(and the factors they reflect) on the amount by which
prices were expected to rise or fall in the months im-
mediately ahead. Chart 25 and Table 44 suggest the
presence of the expected association. The rate of
change in hide prices over the five previous months
looks similar to end-of-month stocks.7 The association is
interesting in that here the causal relation seems to run
from changes in prices through expectations to leather
stocks proper. Because of the lead of prices the logic
of the reverse causal connection is not appealing.
RISK AND TIlE LONG-SHORT MABXET RANGE
In addition to the expected change in prices and the
firmness with which these expectations are held, shifts
in the advance position may be affected by alterations
in risk. One type of factor influencing risk may be the
number of months' supply already on hand as shown in
stock-turnover statistics. The size of gross profits or
operating margins may be another.
We learned that leather stocks typically reduce their
speed of turnover as they rise and increase it as they
fall; The turnover ratio, shown in Chart 27, has an in-
verse and generally synchronous relation to stocks (see
Table 44). When expansions are matched with con-
fractions, and vice versa, the correspondence is quite
high (only 22 per cent of months in unlike phase).
Turnover and the rate of change in stocks, seem to re-
semble one another on a direct rather than inverse
basis, though the peaks in turnover lead with consider-
able regularity peaks in inventory investment (27 per
cent of the months are in unlike phase after allowing
for a three-month lead). But the details of the picture
suggest that the association is without causal signifi-
cance.8
troughs. This is of course what first differences do. Hide prices
proper do not accord with the thesis, since they lag by sub-
stantial intervals that are virtually the same at peaks and
troughs.
It is plotted allowing for a lead of two months. Allowing for
a further lead of one month (a total of three months), certainly
a reasonable figure in context, 26 per cent are in unlike phase.
8 The association might bear on the dynamics of change if the
turn in the ratio typically resulted from differential rates of
change in a parallel direction of output and stocks. Then we
might conclude that it signaled, for example, a less healthy
relationship that was prerequisite to a reversal of trends—stocks
begin to turn less rapidly, and presently the rate at which in-
ventories are rising slows down. But, actually, the peak in the
ratio usually means simply that stocks have turned up. Stocks,
that is, which before had been falling at a decreasing rate, now
start to rise at an increasing rate. Because this phase of ac-
celerating rise is short (usually only a few months) the trough
in first differences follows with some regularity the peak in turn-
over rates (that is, the trough in stocks proper). The sequence
More interesting than the timing of the output-stock'
ratio is the range within which it fluctuates. Over the
entire period, stocks were almost never so large as to
constitute over two and one-third months' output and,
except for two months early in 1933 and after 1938
(when the figures seem to have changed abruptly and
mysteriously), were they less than about one and one-
quarter months' sales. The confinement of stocks to
limits consistent with these ratios may have resulted
from factors having nothing to do with considerations
of turnover per Se. But we know that turnover figures
are watched. It is possible, and indeed likely, that
when stocks on hand reach a figure deemed high, this,
together with the on-order position that may accom-
pany it, drops a red signal, or at least a blinking yellow
one, in the road of further accretions. Conversely, when
stocks get low relative to output, manufacturers are
put on their guard against letting them get lower still.
Even if over-all ratios are not the explicit guide, the
size of the advanceposition for certain specified sorts
of leathers might be. This interpretation seems consist-
ent with what shoe manufacturers say about their
leather buying.
It is consistent, too, with the statistics. The first set
of horizontal lines toward the center of Chart 27 shows
when the ratio of current cattle-hide leather consump-
tion to end-of-month stocks was 0.65 or higher, that is,
about six and one-half weeks' supply or For the
most part, these were periods of declining activity,
when leather stock was or recently had been falling.
The strongest support for the thesis occurs when high
turnover rates appear before the upturn in stocks
proper. But a synchronous association is also consist-
ent with it, on the assumption that the response was
fast and that the on-order position may have given
some advance warning. The chart indicates that the
ratio reached 0.65 at most of the troughs and a few
months before the turn in stocks in all but one instance
once the excess of stocks that followed World War I
had been worked off.'° If one defines the period of low
can be rephrased to apply to troughs in turnover. In a sense this
is simply an arithmetic corollary of the fact that if peaks in in-
ventory investment are matched with troughs of inventory proper
and vice versa, the latter (inventories) lead the former (invest-
ment) and by quite regular intervals. This may be an interesting
fact, but it does not seem to carry causal implications concern-
ing stock-turnover ratios and inventory investment. In this con-
nection, if the series are matched inversely, peaks (troughs) in
turnover lag troughs (peaks) in inventory investment; 34 per
cent are in opposite phase after allowing for a three-month lag.
But this seems simply a mechanical result of the inverse associa-
tion to be discussed presently.
The upper and lower limits were selected by a study of the
chart. They suffer from all the errors of the data as well as from
the cavalier method of choosing them.
10 Trade reports indicate that by 1926 stocks were rio longer
considered abnormally high. During this trend to a lower level
the band of permissible variation would slope upward and be atCHART 27




Specific-subcycle peaks and troughs (broken and solid vertical lines) in leather sfocks (series 75 in Appendix B) are used as reference frame.
For the other series, specific-cycle turns are marked by X, specific.subcycle turns by 0, and retardations by When a specific turn is matched with
a turn in the reference series, a horizontal line or vertical arrow indicates the association. The relation between the ratio and stock is inverse; specific
troughs are matched with reference peaks and specific peaks with reference troughs.
Because of the unaccountably extreme level of the ratio after 1937, the data for 1938—1940 have not been charted. However, turns markec] in the
series during that period have been included in the calculations exhibited in Table 44. The pair of trend lines drawn have a slope of aboutC.8 cents
a month.162 CHAPTER12
turnover that may have tended to put an end to fur-
ther market extension as two months' supply of leather
on hand and in process (a ratio of 0.50), the chart
shows the association with peaks in stocks; leads and
synchronous timing are about evenly divided.
MARGINS
Risk might be judged a function not only of the level
of stock turnover already prevailing—the extent to
which market positions were now extended or con-
tracted—but also of the leeway between profit and
loss, which, in turn, would be positively associated with
changes in ownership position. A similar association
may attach to margins in their capacity as a source of
funds for inventory accumulation: wide margins pro-
vide the funds, narrow margins may not only fail to do
so but actually make it necessary to liquidate inven-
tories to provide funds for other purposes. Indirectly,
wide margins, because of the rosy picture they draw,
may also make funds provided by bankers more avail-
able, though I have seen no evidence that this is true
of short-term fluctuations. Finally margins may influ-
ence leather buying through their influence on expecta-
tions about leather prices.
To shed light on short waves of inventory accumula-
tion, the figures need to be monthly or at least quarterly.
Further, a somewhat different set of figures would be
required to reflect alternatively: sources of cash, prof-
itability, expectations. Monthly estimates can be con-
structed for certain selected costs on the basis of
specified assumptions.'1 Leather costs, typically be-
tween 85 and 50 per cent of the total, can be estimated
on the basis of alternative accounting schemes. Last
in, first out (LIFO) accounting implies that the cur-
rent market price of leather is used in determining
costs, and the current price of sole and cattle-hide
upper leather was used to compute the cost of the fixed
input of the two sorts of leathers.12 First in, first out
(FIFO) accounting is more complicated to reproduce,
but an effort to do so was made by using information
on leather inventories in conjunction with the price sta-
tistics.13 Labor costs per pair, typically between 20 and
a lower level. The same statement applies if beginning rather
than end-of-month stocks are used or if we take 0.70 as the
danger level (a little over six weeks' supply), except that during
the depressed period after 1928, stocks did not fall quite so
low.
11Forsources of this and labor cost estimates, see Chapter 11,
note 80. By and large, leather costs are relatively higher and
labor costs lower for men's than for women's shoes, and for
men's work than for men's dress shoes.
12Itwas assumed that 2.5 square feet of upper and 0.7 square
foot of sole leather was used per pair. For details of the com-
putation see Appendix B, series 20.
'sJassumed that half of the total stocks consisted of high-style
leathers that would typically be purchased for immediate use
80 per cent of total manufacturing costs, can be esti-
mated by. using industry payroll data, though there is
a technical difficulty to be circumvented.'4 Overhead
costs can be guessed only on the basis of highly formal
procedures. Aggregate overhead was assumed to be
subject only to trend and to cyclical change associated
with changes in salaries; unit overhead was calculated
by dividing an estimated total by output.'5
The three major sorts of costs per pair—leather,
labor, and overhead—summed and expressed as a per-
centage of the average price of cattle-hide leather shoes
and subtracted from 100, should presumably give an
approximate picture of changing percentage profits per
pair ignoring the impact on profits of changing valua-
tion of all sorts. Samples of these calculations summed
for twelve months are assembled in Chart 28. The
LIFO leather-cost margin assumes that costs were
based on the current market price of leather. FIFO as-
sumes that historic costs were used and leather was
bought earlier (by the average age of leather inven-
tories) than shoes were sold; the third calculation as-
sumes that leather was bought at the most advanta-
geous time within the previous eight months.
The estimates of based on these several as-
sumptions (and ignoring changes in evaluation) may
be compared with profits as reported by corporations.
The first set of these charted lines are broadly based
yet their movement shows no relation to the margins
over three types of costs calculated on either a LIFO
or a FIFO basis assuming purchases had been made
and thus were never more than one month old; consequently,
leather prices of the previous month represented their cost. The
rest of leather stocks may be purchased in advance; I assume that
their average age, as actually shown in statistics on stocks, deter-
mined how far in advance they were purchased and, consequently,
the month in which their cost was set by the then current price of
leather.
Cattle-hideleather shoes for which price data are available
are staple footwear (these figures are needed to compute mar-
gins). To get labor costs per staple shoe, we cannot divide pay-
rolls in the boot and shoe industry by the number of pairs pro-
duced, since the high-style women's shoe played a changing
part in the total. Instead, we divide payrolls by a specially con-
structed index of production in which, in effect, other than
staple shoes are counted in terms of equivalent staple shoes. For
details of the computation see Appendix B, series 5.
Thefirst step was to compute the average for 1922—1940
of the difference between an estimated total factory value of
shoe production and total materials and labor costs plus an
allowance for profits. This average annual additional cost, in
which the overhead type of expense plays an important part,
was assumed to be subject to a trend influence computed by
fitting a straight-line trend to the annual figures. However, cycli-
cal changes in salaries of clerical and administrative workers
would affect aggregate overhead and the figures were adjusted
further to allow for these changes. This total was then divided
by the dollar value of output each year to get the overhead cost
per dollar of sales, or by number of pairs of shoes produced to
get overhead costs per pair. For further detail see Appendix B,
series 6.— ———— —-——--—-—--—---- ---. — —- '_•_--—--—-—,-—-.--w
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CHART 28
Shoe Manufacturers' Margins and Profits as Per-
centages of Sates, 1922—1941
over Leather, Labor, and Overhead Cost
for Cattle-Hide Leather Shoes
Per cent
1926—I 934: Compiled net profits before taxes as a percentage of
gross soles for monufocturers of boots and slippers,oil corporations
reporting to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (Statistics ai Income, Source
Book). 1936-1941:Operatingprofits as a percentage of net soles of
211 shoe manufacturing companies reporting to the Office of Price
Administration (L. D. Howell, Marketing ond Monufocturing Margins for
Hides end Skins, Leather and Leather Products, Bureau of Agricultural
Economics, Tech. Bull. 961, July 1948, Table 33, p. 51).
b Net profits before taxes as a percentage of net sales. 7929—7935:
Thirteen companies (Agricultural Income Inquiry, Federal Trade Com-
mission, Part Ill, Supplementary Report, 1937. pp. 24—25). 7936—1941:
ze Thor Hultgren found a similarabsenceof direct association
between margins over input costs and reported profits in meat
packing (see 33rd Annual Report, National Bureau of Economic
+10
Research,1953, P. 32) and for railroading (American Tran.spor-
tation in Prosperity and Depression, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, 1948). See also Alvin H. Hansen, "Prime Costs
in the Business Cycle," Journal of Political Economy, February
0 1924,pp. 1—4.
17ask whether the direction of change in profits from year
to year for the large sample is the same as that for the con-
structed margin figures. For the LIFO calculation it was the
same 6 times and different 7 times. The score was 5 apd 5 for
FIFO. For the most advantageous leather costs, direction of
change was similar 9 and dissimilar 4 times. If the sharp break
in the rate of increase of reported profits 1933 to 1934 is counted
as a fall, the score for LIFO is 5 the same and 8 different, and
for most advantageous costs 10 the same and 3 different,
I have also made comparisons between leather and labor
costs alone and margin over materials and labor cost as reported
in the biennial Census of Manufactures. But the census figures
trace a gently sloping curve reaching a peak in 1927 and a
trough in 1937. Their year-to-year change consequently bears
no resemblance at all to either our cost calculations or to profits
as reported by corporations.
Twelve tofourteen componins ("Data onProfits and Operations,"






Using FIFO teether cost (15)
more or less in accordance with But when pur-
chasers of leather are assumed to make the most of op-
portunities afforded by changing leather prices, the
margins as calculated are somewhat more similar to
profits as reported by corporations.'7 In 1927 and 1933
particularly,the behavior of "most advantageous
leather cost" suggests that the rise in reported profits
may have been associated either with early purchases
of leather or in some other way with recent apprecia-
lion in the value of leather.
In general, it seems evident that the monthly figures
that could be computed are not suitable to represent
the over-all profitability of shoe manufacturing as re-
ported by corporations. For this there are at least three
reasons: changes in input of leather and labor, which
are known to play an important part in business tactics,
are inaccessible to the calculation, which must presume
constant input; the time-pattern of actual buying can
not be accurately reproduced, changes in valuation are
not included.
But whatever the deficiencies of the figures! as an in-
dex of profits or sources of funds, they are not without
value. They portray the relation between the cost of
the major material, leather, and the price of the finished
article. Comparisons of this sort are made constantly
by people responsible for buying leather, and for pro-
ducing and selling shoes. It seems almost inevitable that
they will influence opinions and actions. Specifically,
they may bear on expectations about prices and con-
sequently on buying policy. Just what the form of the
influence is likely to be will be better stated after a
Shoe Manufaaturers' Net Profits before Taxes
"
—5
- Over 200 companies a
12—14 companies b
- One large company C






look at monthly data. The series 'chosen is the margin
over current leather costs (LIFO) and. estimated labor
cost per pair of cattle-hide leather shoes.18 The figures
were plotted in Chart 27.
Margins so defined seem to bear an inverse associa-
tion to stocks. If peaks are matched with troughs, 25
per cent of months are in opposite phase and there are
virtually an even number of leads and lags.'° Leather
prices are far more subcyclically sensitive than shoe
prices, and thus have an inverse relation to margins but
a positive association to leather stocks of shoe manu-
facturers. Arithmetically, this causes the inverse asso-
ciation between margins and stocks during short move-
ments. At the level of causal analysis, it is puzzling, and
at first seems to suggest that accumulation of stock in
trade is unassociated with these margin figures. For,
certainly, there is no reason why shoe manufacturers
should start to increase their stocks the moment mar-
gins begin to fall. The mere fact that margins fall can
hardly portend an immediate rise in leather prices. The
inverse association also seems to rule against the possi-
bility that the figures reflect some significant aspect of
facilitating finance for inventory accretions. Indeed,
were the inverse association all that the figures showed,
we would have to conclude that either they hide some
relationship that might appear were other factors held
constant, or that businessmen simply are not influenced
by the difference between.buying and selling prices in
making their decisions about buying for inventories.20
Incidentally, the same statement would apply to the
relationship between margins and the volume of out-
put or the volume of total leather buying.
But the inverse association is not all that the figures
show. Here, as in the case of the sales-stock ratio, the
data seem to fluctuate only within a certain range. In-
deed, it is quite striking that though leather prices jump
all over the lot, margins stay within quite narrow limits
most of the time. This is certainly not a result of the
18 As far as the short fluctuations are concerned, almost any
other set would have told substantially the same story. For a
description of the computations see series 10 in Appendix B.
19 See Table 44. The timing association for aggregate margins
isalso shown (the charted series multiplied by output in
standardized shoes). This series has the advantage of giving the
aggregate fund for the industry out of which many expenses of a
more or less inflexible sort must be met and thus may reflect an
important element in business thinking. Aggregate margins seem
to exhibit quite as close an inverse association to stocks as pair
margins, 24 per cent are in opposite phase with a mOnth lag.
Margins as a per cent of sales have the same over-all timing
relationship, though less clearly. Had overhead been included,
the picture would have been complicated by a tendency for
margins to move in the same direction as output and, therefore,
stock during long and strong swings in output; the association
during short swings, on the other hand, remains inverse.
20 It seems proper to assume that the size of shoe manu-
facturers' stocks of leather may be regarded primarily as voluntary
rather than the result of factors that are basically not subject
to control.
ineptitude of the calculations which probably over-
rather than understate fluctuation since they do not
allow for the many adjustments to which input is sub-
ject.
Maintenance of margins within tolerable limits may
be achieved by charging prices for shoes that keep
pace with leather prices. But there is little evidence
that this procedure, were it followed, could explaip the
behavior of margins in the neighborhood of their abso-
lute highs and lows. Shoe prices parallel at least the
long swings in leather prices, but this parallelism serves
to moderate, not to reverse, the course of margins as
they approach their turning points.
I suggest a different explanation. Businessmen know
that leather prices rise when the market is tightening
,and decline when tension is falling off, and that shoe
prices are hard to increase and, consequently, should
not be lightly decreased. They know too that, though
labor cost may be made to compensate partially for in-
creases in leather cost, they cannot do so wholly. The
same may be said about other defenses against chang-
ing buying prices, such as changes in material input
and adjustment of the time when buying is done. This
means that margins will tend to move' inversely to the
short-term state of the market. To prohibit such a move-
ment would involve a different price and sales policy,
which would be inadvisable on other grounds. In short,
businessmen expect this inverse movement of margins
over leather and labor costs to take place and elect to
tolerate a certain 'amount of it rather than to incur the
cost of the actions that might prevent it.
However, a time is bound to come when this policy
of acquiescence must come to an end as margins drop
too low or rise too high. The figures suggest that a band
of around twenty cents per pair of shoes marks the typi-
cal limits within which this group of expenses other
than leather and labor costs plus profits has fluctuated
over the years. Though little confidence can be placed
in the figure itself (it is certainly too wide relative to
total costs since shifts in input are ignored), the data
suggest that when fluctuation exceeds usual limits
something happens to reverse the course of margins.
What may that be?
At an arithmetic level, margins (as calculated) re-
verse their course because of a change in either shoe
prices or leather prices per pair. The highly stable
and often lagging shoe prices are not the innovator,
and therefore it must be leather prices. At a causal level,
the link between margins and leather prices involves
the buying policies of shoe manufacturers. Since their
sales are not likely to be markedly affected by atten-
tion to operating margins (through the prices of shoes),
buying for current output is ,also not likely to be the
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tories. A shift of the demand schedule for leather, due
to a shift in the desire to hold stocks, could cause a shift
in the price of leather of a sort to reverse the course of
margins.
It seems improbable that this shift in the demand
schedule would reflect operating margins, or more par-
ticularly, profits, in the role of a source of funds for in-
ventory investment. As margins could be computed,
they did not reproduce the course of reported profits;
nor did they seem to provide a meaningful measure of
a source of funds. Even if they had, before funds grow
tight enough to restrict inventory accumulation, they
must have been scarce for several months (or ample
for several months at troughs) whereas the actual data
are not characterized by this sort of pattern.
Rather does it seem probable that the part that mar-
gins play in shifting the desire to accumulate stocks,
other things the same, operates through a change in
expectations aboUt the course of leather prices and per-
haps the risk associated with a given course of action.
•Though unit margins over direct costs are expected to
move inversely to output, there are limits beyond which
their movement is deemed unhealthy; these limits have
some general currency in the trade. One way that
margins may be kept within these limits though costs
are rising is by appropriate increase in the price
charged for shoes. But at times, manufacturers seem to
have judged that shoe prices cannot be advanced
enough to correct the deficiency without damaging
sales. At such times, as margins reach the point where
they are considered too narrow and further reduction is
thought dangerous, the price of leather approaches, by
definition, a level too high for profitable operation.
The notion that leather prices are, in this sense, too
high raises doubts as to whether they are likely to go
much higher. These doubts at least soften the desire to
extend the market position farther. In addition, the
thought that prices are too high is likely to make buyers
resist further increases. Still further resistance may
be engendered; for, narrow margins mean that buy-
ing based on a wrong guess about prices may now not
only reduce profits but imply a more serious risk—that
of turning profits into losses. This set of reactions
would all tend to make buyers less eager to buy and
more finicky about the price they pay. What is more,
the influences reinforce one another insofar as the ex-
perience and behavior of prospective buyers and sellers
at the bargaining table, or during more peripheral con-
tacts, have the power to influence expectations. In con-
sequence, buyers cease to extend their market position
and indeed start to contract it, inventories begin to fall
as leather prices weaken, and margins cease narrow-
ing and start to widen.
With minor changes, the argument may be reversed
to apply to the trough. Also, when margins are wide,
shoe manufacturers' expectations about future prices
may be buoyed by the thought that leather dealers
(whose finished inventories have ceased to rise at their
earlier rate) are bound to try to capture some of the
wider manufacturing margins by stiffening their price
demands. The expectation of a reversal in price trends
causes an effort to acquire stocks before the expected
rise sets in.
Unfortunately, the argument that I have outlined is
not capable of an empirical test. If margins do not trans-
gress the tolerable limits, they can presumably cling
close to them for long periods of time without causing
a reversal in expectations. At the same time, if asking
prices involve hypothetical margins that seem danger-
ously narrow and consequently lead to a downward
shift in expectations, buying will falter, leather prices
will drop, and actual margins will widen, even though
actual (as éontrastèd with hypothetical) margins have
not previously crossed the danger line. All that the
figures may show, therefore, will be margins varying
within fairly standardized limits and an inverse and
largely synchronous association between margins and
change in stocks. This is about what the figures do
show, and this is all they show. Chart 27 indicates by
broken horizontal bars the months when margius were
in their higher reaches and therefore may have pre-
saged an upturn in inventories; another set of 'bars re-
fers to months when margins were low. In neither case
does the beginning of these areas, rather than tha actual
turns in margins, seem to have a systematic assOciation
with the turns in inventories. Only if asking prices
(rather than actual prices) could be seen could the
figures presumably demonstrate how considerations
governing margins operate to limit inventory fluctua-
tion.
Importance of Market Prospects
The general tenor of the evidence supplied both by
examination of business practice and of time series has
emphasized the importance of the impact of auctua-
tion in market prospects on inventory investment.
Insofar as business judgments focused on the proper
timing of buying dominate the character of the Eluctua-
tions in leather stocks, these fluctuations will be rela-
tively important at times when and for materials where
such judgments can be given free rein. One way of
evaluating their relative importance would be to note
the difference among times and among materials in
the relative contribution to fluctuation in leather re-
ceipts of changes in leather consumption, on the one
hand, and in investment in stocks, on the other hand.
It seems likely that the responsibility of inventory
investment for fluctuations in leather receipts may well166 CHAPTER12
be greater in fairly good times than in bad ones. This
question is put to the data in Table 46, which is actu-
ally the work sheet for our standard average timing
comparison. The table gives the dates of each specific-
subcycle turn that has been marked in cattle-hide
leather receipts and, for each series, the lead or lag
at each specific-subcycle turn related to those of re-
ceipts by our timing rules. When the crash of 1929 sent
industry scuttling to hand-to-mouth buying, we find a
one-to-one relation between turns in consumption and
turns in receipts, with a predominance of synchronous
timing. In the twenties, and after recovery in the
thirties, we find more evenly divided responsibility be-
tween the two components of receipts, though invest-
ment in stocks shows the clearer association as well
as a leading one.2'
21 The percentage of months in unlike phase with subcycles in








Consumption of LeatherChange in Stocks
Matched with a Matched with a
1-Month Lag 1-Month Lead
P = peak, Ttrough in manufacturers' leather receipts (89)
used as reference frame.
o = a specific turn that could not be related under the timing
rules (see Appendix A, secs. lOa, b, c, and d)
i.d. = insufficient data.
Unmatched reference turns are shown as a blank.
a Series 89 in Appendix B, see also Appendix A, sec. I.
b First differences are centered five-month moving averages
of month-to-month change.
When the association is inverse, specific peaks are matched






Timing of Subcycical Turns in SelectedSeries Compared with Turns in Leather-Goods Manufacturers' Leather Receipts, 1921—1940
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The distinction based on timing comparisons may
be tested by amplitude comparisons. Table 41 (in
Chapter 11) led to the conclusion that the aggregate
subcyclical amplitude of leather receipts, 1921—1940,
was, at an arithmetic level, due 40 per cent to fluctua-
tions in consumption and 60 per cent to fluctuations in
inventory investment. In the period of the long depres-
sion—from the peak in receipts, June 1929, to the trough
in February 1933, consumption contributed 68 per cent
and inventory investment 32 per cent of the total fluc-
tuation in receipts. For the rest of the period the
figures were reversed—34 and 66.
Instead of making a distinction on the basis of dif-
ferent times, it can be made on the basis of various
sorts of leather. Sole leather is a relatively safe prop-
erty; a given grade of sole can be used on a wide
variety of individual shoes; and, consequently, there
is little risk of being unable to use it eventually. In-
formation on consumption and inventories of sole
leather, as distinct from cattle-bide upper leather, is
lacking. However, data are available on receipts of
the two sorts of leather by leather-goods manufac-
turers. Comparing receipts of each sort first with in-
ventory investment and then with consumption of both
sorts, we find that inventory investment appears to
play a more important part in the determination of
the pattern of receipts of sole leather than of upper
leather, and the reverse is true of consumption. For
sole leather, receipts and inventory investment are in
unlike subcycical phase (allowing for the typical lead
of one month) only 15 per cent of the time. For upper
leather, the figure (synchronous timing) is 28 per cent.
Comparing consumption and inventory investment, we
find the corresponding figures 30 per cent for sole and
22 per cent for upper leather.22 Clearly, then, the staple
sole leather, the most eligible sort in which to vary the
advance position in accordance with market prospects,
is more than other leathers responsible for short-term
fluctuations in receipts. These figures seem to lend sup-
port to the notion that market considerations are highly
important determinants of inventory investment in
Multivariate Anal ysi.s
All of these efforts to observe in gross investment or
receipts the influence of the several causal factors
thought to be involved are, of course, a roundabout
and crude way to test the theory. The theory states
that many factors are involved. Could each be per-
fectly represented by a time series, it is altogether pos-
sible that no one of them would have a visually obvi-
ous association with the dependent variable, although
each had a perfect relation, ceteris paribus. The situa-
tion calls for multivariate analysis. Taking inventories
as the variable to be explained, I tried a straight-line
multiple-correlation scheme for the monthly data in
which the several independent variables were repre-
sented as best we could.24 It was a total failure.
Though the multiple-correlation coefficient was rea-
sonably high (.81) estimated inventoriesleather
showed only a chance smattering of the minor waves
displayed by actual stocks. The respectable over-all
correlation resulted primarily from the ability to "ex-
plain" the broad sweep of the data. Annual figures
would have appeared to be quite adequately repre-
sented, but monthly figures showed up the deiiciencies
Change In
ConiumptionLeather PriceHide Price
24 Cattle-hide leather stocks was the dependent variable. The
figure, say, for the end of January, was "explained" by domestic
consumption of leather during February, the price of cattle-hide
leather during January, and the five-month average of month-to-
month change in cattle-hide prices for September to January
(average change in hide prices proper, August to Janriary). The
calculation covered the period January 1922 to December 1937,
after which the stock figures plunged downward in what seemed
to be a curious fashion. For the total period the extreme range of
the consumption parameter explained 71 per cent of the extreme
range in stocks, and the corresponding figures for the other in-
dependent variables were: leather prices, 25 per cent; change in
hide prices, 7 per cent. But these figures are unstable. When the
period is broken in two parts at the beginning of 1932, the figures
for the three variables for the first period were 59, 8, and 17
per cent; and for the second period, 54, 8, and 8 per cent. The
correlation coefficients for the two periods were .83 and .85,
respectively.
If trend is added as an additional variable the percentage ex-
treme contribution of each variable to the explanation of the
extreme variation in stocks switches again:
Period Trend
Full period 59 8 1 27
First half 12 11 22 74
Second half 59 15 7 33
The introduction of additional variables (first differences in
consumption and one representing the limits appreached by
margins were added) serve primarily to cause peculiar shifts in
the other variables.
All in all, the computations—because they were done by
machine they were more various than they otherwise eould have
been—demonstrate primarily how the wealth of information
(monthly rather than annual data, two time periods instead of
one, the use of additional variables) can serve to demonstratethat
a calculation is a failure which might otherwise (had itbeen
done with annual data for the full period only) have been con-
sidered a success.
22 When compared with inventory investment, receipts of sole
leather have 30 matching thins, 2 unmatched, and inventory in-
vestment no unmatched ones. The corresponding figures for
upper leather are 27, 4, and 4. When compared with leather
consumption, receipts of sole leather have 22 matching turns, 10
unmatched, and consumption 4 unmatched ones. The correspond-
ing figures for upper leather are 26, 6, 0.
28 Part of the difference between the behavior of stocks of
sole and upper leather may result from the fact that extension
or contraction of the commitment position is more likely in the
latter than in the former to take the form of variation in stocks
on order (rather than on hand). Insofar as the ownership posi-
tion in upper leather consists of unspecified blanket orders,
virtually everything that has been said of sole leather stocks
would be applicable.168 CHAPTER12
of the calculation. Actually, there is every reason to
expect that the several factors bearing on fluctuations
in stocks will contribute to long- and to short-term
change in different proportions. The whole set of fac-
tors associated with market expectations, for exam-
pIe, are basically very short-run considerations. At the
other extreme, most American businesses have tried
to get along with smaller inventories as modern man-
.agement techniques have developed and taken hold,
Sand yet this movement is not well represented by a
straight-line trend.
These findings and reflections suggest a technique
that concentrates more particularly on the short move-
:ments. Consequently, the variables in the first set of
computations were differenced.25 Table 47 lists the
VAlUABLES
Xo = firstdifferences in manufacturers' leather stocks
(74)
X, =firstdifferences in leather consumption (45)
X2 =firstdifferences in hide prices (23)
X3 =seconddifferences in hide prices (23)
Regression equation
Standard errors of regression coefficients
P-coefficients a
with the, actual ones (see Chart 29), an interesting
result appears. The combined influence of the two
variables (the. fl-coefficients show X1 and X2 contrib-
ute about equally) reproduces most of the ups and
downs in inventory investment, but the movements are
severely muted in the computed series. To bring out
the similarity in the movements, I have smoothed both
actual and computed inventory investment by a five-
month moving average and plotted the computed
figures on a scale that doubles their amplitude. Except
between 1934 and 1936 when drought slaughter over-
hung the market, the computation certainly succeeds
in reproducing most of the fluctuations, and virtually
only those, that actually occurred in inventory invest-
ment. Nevertheless, the extent of the movement is very
TABLE 47
Standard error of estimate
Multiple correlation coefficient
"P-coefficients give the proportion of the standard deviation
of shoe sales that is "explained" by the standard deviation times
variables and describes the results of fitting a straight-
line equation to the data. Apparently all of the vari-
ables have the appropriate sign, but the contribution
of second differences in hide prices (representing the
specific guess about changes in prices) is not reliably
indicated by the computation and is, in any event,
negligible. If it is left out, the other two variables
(representing sales and the cumulative force of mar-
ket optimism or pessimism) contribute about equally
to changes in stocks, and each is clearly statistically
significant. The coefficient of multiple correlation, al-
though low, is significant at the 1 per cent probability
level.
If the computed values are charted and compared
25 Hide prices, appearing in these calculations as first differ-
ences in hide prices, were substituted for leather prices and
centered one month earlier.
Millions of equivalent hides
Millions of equivalent hides
Dollars
Dollars




poorlyreproduced. Study of Chart 29 suggests at least
one reason for the underestimation of amplitude. The
month-to-month movement of first differences in prices
and consumption isexceedingly choppy. For the
monthly ups and downs, in contrast to their five-month
averages, there seems little relation between independ-
ent and dependent variables. This suggests that cor-
relation ought to be improved if some of this saw-tooth
pattern is eliminated by using a longer period. Accord-
ingly, I used quarterly data; the correlation coefficient
was .66 (for the monthly data it was .46). Incidentally,
quarterly figures assigned hide prices a more important
part than did the monthly calculations. The fi coeffi-
cients were .28 and .58 for consumption and hide prices
(for the monthly data they were .32 and .35).
I find both the success and failure of these calcula-
tions extremely interesting and am loath to leave them
Inventory Investment of Leather-Goods Manufacturers in Finished Leather Estimated on the Basis of Three and Two Variables,
Monthly, 1922—1937
EXAMPLE OF MONTHS THAT ARE MATCHED: UNITS
Change during January
Change from January to February
Change from November to December
Change in first differences (X2) October
through December
THREE-VABIABLE REGRESSION
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without further probing. However, the abundance of
choice as to the next step makes it advisable to do so.26
28Fourlines of attack or a combination of them suggest
themselves. First, since it is true that the long- and short-range
changes in inventories may well be the result of different factors
or at least of factors operating in different proportions, there
might be something to be said for making the explanation in
two steps—first for the level of stocks and then for departures
from the general level. Second, there are reasons to experiment
with a different function. We did try one calculation for quar-
terly data using link relatives rather than monthly first differ-
ences. This is simply a mathematical conversion of the straight-
line function fitted to the data proper. But the results were
inconclusive. The correlation coefficient was now a little higher
than when first differences were used—.713 rather than .664—
andthe two variables contributed about the same proportion
of the explanation—P coefficients were .28 for consumption and
.61 for hide prices. Differences in the price ratios, the equiva-
lent of second differences for the other computation, added
nothing to the explanation. A third line of attack would be to
alter the variables and perhaps their timing too. Finally, an
equation system rather than a single equation is certainly indi-
cated (see the explanation of hide prices in terms of leather re-
ceipts of leather-goods manufacturers and a stock-location ra-
tio), though it is hard to say how it can be realistically achieved.
One last caution: the stock series is itself a derived series.
Concerning the Independent Contribution of
Shoe Manufacturing to Fluctuation
In general, the data just reviewed lend some support
and further specificity to the hypothesis under exami-
nation. But they are also compatible with other ex-
planations. Because the logic of the inventory invest-
ment process applies far more clearly to inventories
on hand and on order than to the former alone, the
correct statistical data (on orders for shoes rather than
on shoe production, and on orders for leather rather
than on leather receipts) could easily differ from those
I was forced to use. Were the difference extreme, it
could explain in whole or part the patterns of inven-
tory investment that have been observed.
Assume, for example, that shoe manufacturers place
orders for all leather when, and only when, they write
orders for shoes, and that leather is received within a
week or two of the order date. Shoes are produced,
however, in accordance with stipulated delivery dates,
and these fluctuate far less than orders (being linked
See textandTable 47 for explanation of the data. The moving averages are of month.to.month change and are centered.170 CHAPTER 12
as nearly as possible to the pattern of consumer buy-
ing as retailers foresee it). In this event, inventory in-
vestment of shoe manufacturers will have consider-
able subcyclical variation and will probably show the
tendency to lead output as well as many of the other
observed characteristics. Shifts in market prospects
may still be primarily responsible for behavior, but in
this case it would be the views of retailers and whole-
salers rather than those of manufacturers of shoes that
are reflected in the fluctuations of manufacturers'
stocks. Is it possible to say whether this explanation,
or one that attributes inventory fluctuation largely to
decisions of the manufacturers, is the correct one?
On the basis of what executives say about proce-
dures, there is every reason to believe that both ex-
planations contribute. The description in the previous
paragraph is not entirely unrealistic; still, shoe manu-
facturers' statements about their leather buying indi-
cate that they do not simply pass on their customers'
orders to tanners after converting them to leather re-
quirements. Even were they to keep the monetary in-
vestment in goods constant as their customers in-
creased their advanced orders, leather buying would
experience relative expansion. A given number of do!-
Jars released from investment in finished or partly
finished goods and invested in raw materials (which
represent only a fraction of the cost of the finished
article) increases the number of items owned by the
manufacturer; the number of weeks' supply of shoes
released would be balanced by perhaps twice as many
weeks' supply of leather acquired. It is desirable to
know whether there is a tendency for this total commit-
ment position to remain constant, with the resultant
whip to leather buying, or whether buying fluctuates
still more through explicit additional extension or con-
traction of the ownership position in leather.
Turning again to the time series, we search for
specffic evidence on the contribution of shoe manu-
facturers themselves to buying waves. Information on
inventory investment might conceivably be helpful if
there were reason to believe 'that the timing of fluctua-
tions might be different if it resulted from the decisions
of distributors, on the one hand, or shoe manufac-
turers, on the other. But this is not the expectation
that these studies foster. Judgments about the future
of prices and stringencies in procurement are likely to
be based on the same criteria at whatever vertical level
they are made. Buying reflecting shifting market pros-
pects will consequently not presumably be systemat-
ically earlier or later at one stage than another (though
receipts, of course, might be).
Ideally, the second hypothesis—the notion that shoe
producers add to, rather than merely transmit, the
fluctuations in distributors' orders—needs to be tested
with information on orders for shoes and for leather
and by their comparison with shoe production and
leather receipts. But the order data are lacking. De-
flated wholesale sales, having some of the character-
istics of orders for shoes, have an average subcycical
amplitude, 1922 to 1940, of 2.60 per cent of their aver-
age standing per month; the corresponding figure for
leather receipts is 3.84. Were wholesale sales a true
order series—and needless to say it is very far from
that—these statistics would suggest that manufac-
turers do augment fluctuations as well as transmit
them. The data on shoe and leather orders combined
have still further shortcomings for this purpose.27 Tim-
ing comparisons between receipts and the stand-ins
for orders show an average synchronous association
that is quite close, as the summary figures in Table 48
show;. (the details are given in Table 46). The similar-
ity in timing attests to elements of homogeneity in
market prospects for retailers and shoe manufacturers,
rather than indicating which of the two initiate fluctua-
tion in leather receipts.28
Another method of testing the impact of price ex-
pectations on receipts (Or orders) was developed in
Chapter 9. There, data on shoe production were used
to inform about shoe ordering on the assumption that
habits of the trade are such that in some months (stip-
ulated on the basis of a knowledge of buying proce-
dure) larger than usual production meant larger than
usual advance orders, whereas the reverse was neces-
sarily true of the rest of the months. Although discus-
sions with shoe manufacturers and tanners did not in-
dicate that parallel assumptions would be valid at this
stage, it nevertheless seemed worthwhile to test the
proposition for leather receipts (the total, and upper
and sole leather separately) and for upper-leather pro-
duction. For each activity, taking one month at a time,
the ratios to 'the surrounding twelve months were cor-
related with recent changes in hide prices (as an in-
dication of the temper of market prospects). Results
were either negative or ambiguous. The statistics, in
27 The per month subcyclical amplitude for shoe and leather
orders is 4.68 per cent of the average value. Since orders seem
frequently to be reported in dollars rather than in physical
volume, this figure is substantially high to be compared with the
one for receipts expressed in equivalent hides of leather—3.84.
An allowance for conversion to physical volume would probably
reverse the direction of the difference in amplitude between
orders and receipts. In addition, an allowance also needs to be
made, but cannot be, for the fact that the leather-order com-
ponent of the shoe-and-leather-order series might have a higher
subcycical amplitude than the shoe-order component.
28 Strong similarity between the market profile and manu-
facturers' leather stocks or their rates of change may at least be
consistent with the thought (though with other hypotheses, too)
that the latter were significantly conditioned by distributors' shoe,
rather than by manufacturers' leather, buying. But though com-
parisons show no systematic differences, they also show a negli-
gible correlation;MANUFACTURERS' BUY1NG—2 171
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Timing of Subcycles: Leather-Goods Manufacturers' Receipts of Leather Compared with Selected Data, 192 1—194(1
REFERENCE FRAME: MANUFACTURERS' LEATHER RECEIPTS (36 TURNs) a
surrounding twelve months each year were ranked. The change
in hide prices from December through March for eich year
were ranked. Correlation coefficients for the two pairs of rank
standings each year were computed. The procedure was dupli-
cated for each month and repeated with the data for receipts
substituted for upper leather production.
A general correlation of hide prices and output is indicated b
the fact that the coefficients of rank correlation for virtually a
months are positive. The same may be said if we study the
association of leather receipts and change in hide prices, or of
receipts of upper and sole leather separately. For upper leather







NUMBER OF TURNS b Mean Lead (—) AverageDevia- and That
Matched Turns or Lag (+) of: flon from: Trough Correspondence
Syn-Central Mean Mean forTiming Lead (—)
All Lead- Lag- chro-3 or 4Allof All Peaks and Consistencyor Lag (--)
TurnsTotalingging nousTurnsTurnsTurnsTroughs Index e (months)(%)
(1)(2)(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Leather consumption (45) 2626 2 13 11+0.5+0.8 1.2 1.2 g +1 22
First differences:
Manufacturers' leather
stocks (74) 3129 15 7 7 —0.7—0.6 1.1 1.0 +32 —1 21
All leather stocks (71) h 2826 13 5 8 —0.5—0.8 1.5 1.6 +16 —1 26
Wholesale shoe sales, pairs (35)2827 8 7 12 0 —0.2 1.7 1.7 g 0 28




• Lead (—)or TIMING (months) C
NUMBER Lag (+) of: NUMBER Mean Lead (—)
OF MATCHED PEAKS Cen- Aver- OF MATCHED TROUGHS or Lag (+)of:,Aver-
Syn-tral age Syn-Central age
Lead- Lag- chro-3 or 4AllDevia- Lead- Lag- chro-3 or 4 AllDevia-
Totalingging nousPeaks PeakstionTotalinggingnousTroughs Troughstion
(13)(14) (15) (16)(17)(18)(19) (20)(21)(22)(23) (24) (25) (26)
Leather consumption 13 2 74 +0.7 +0.8 1.6 13 0 6 7 +0.3 +0.8 0.9
First differences:
Manufacturers' leather stocks 14 5 54 0—0.2 1.0 15 10 2 3 —1.0 —0.9 1.0
All leather stocks 13 8 23 —1.0 —1.21.6 13 5 3 5 0 0.5 1.5
Wholesale shoe sales, pairs 13 6 43 —0.3 —0.52.3 14 2 3 9 0 +0.1 1.1
Shoe and leather orders 9 2 43+0.3 +0.20.7 8 2 2 4 0 +0.1 1.2
Series 89 in Appendix B. The first differences are centered five-month moving averages
b For the rules used in matching subcycle turns, see Appendix of month-to-month change.
A, secs. lOa, b, c, and d; see also Appendix A, sec. I. gNotcomputed, because peak and trough timing differences
See Appendix A, sec. 11. were obviously insignificant.
d See Appendix A, sec. 14. h The association is inverse; thus, specific peaks are matched
e From the timing at each peak is subtracted the timing at the with reference troughs, and specffic troughs with reference peaks.
previous and following trough. Each time the sign of the differ- 'Comparisons are bettered relative to those for the other series
ence accords with that of the difference between the average by the fact that shoe and leather orders are first available in 1927.
peak and trough timing, +100 is set down; each time it differs, If the percentage of months in unlike subcycical phase are corn-
—100; and if it is the same, zero. The ratings are then summed puted for the same period—1927—1940—for consumption and
and divided by the number of comparisons (see Appendix A, wholesale sales, the figures are 14 and 19, respectively.
sec. llb, ¶4).
accord with what people had said, failed to suggest the
presence of seasonal buying patterns that were suffi-
ciently sharp,sufficiently reflected in patterns of
leather production or receipts, or sufficiently differen-
tiated from those of distributors, to make it possible to
distinguish between leather buying of manufacturers
that did and did not reflect the buying of their cus-
tomers.29
29 Theratiosfor, say, upper-leather production for Apriltothe172 CHAPTER 12
All in all, we simply do not have the statistical data
that might help to answer whether part or all of the
fluctuations in manufacturers' stocks may directly re-
flect buying movements for shoes rather than partly re-
flect independent movements in the buying of leather.
However, what we have learned of shoe manufac-
turers' buying problems and procedures strongly sug-
gest, and the statistics do not deny, that whatever the
volatility of shoe buying, leather buying adds to, as
well as passes along, these fluctuations as they impinge
on the operation of tanners.
Conclusions
As demand moves backward through the stage
where the finished shoe is produced, there is, as at the
marketing stage, a magnification as well as an accelera-
tion of fluctuations, especially of the shorter fluctua-
tions, in consumer buying. The movement of cattle-
hide leather into shoe manufacturers' establishments
broadly parallels the output of shoes. Though there
has been a downward trend in the leather used per
pair of shoes, the major cycles in the consumption of
cattle-hide leather, finished leather goods, and receipts
of cattle-hide leather by shoe manufacturers are closely
parallel, though their leather stocks, too, rose when
production rose and fell when it fell. Corresponding
minor as well as major movements appear in input and
clearly better than for others: June is universally high, and March
and April (for which the shifting date of Easter introduces com-
plications). is typically very low, and there are months of high
correlation around the turn of the year. For sole-leather de-
liveries (no computations were made for sole-leather production
since this seemed the least likely place to find seasonal patterns
dependent on the patterns of buying) there seems little difference
among months, suggesting the absence of seasonal patterns for
advance buying as contrasted with other buying.
About all these figures seem to show is that for upper leathers
there may well be certain months in which optimistic price
expectation fosters more buying than in other months, and this
may simply reflect patterns in shoe ordering. Only if the months
of high correlation between expectations and, hypothetically,
orders for leather preceded those for shoes, or showed a clearly
stronger positive correlation, might the information be interpreted
as bearing witness to independent action on the part of shoe
manufacturers. But the figures do not show such differences. For
the most part, the shoe and leather orders are price-sensitive
in the same months or at least not in -significantly different
months. Neither the average positive correlation nor the co-
efficients for the months in which correlation tends to be highest
are more clearly marked in the leather than in the shoe data.
These negative results carry no positive message. They could in-
dicate any one of several things, and there is no way of knowing
which. They could, for example, mean, first, that leather buying
simply follows the patterns of shoe buying; second, that though
leather buying has patterns of its own, other factors hide it; or
third, that the analysis is- irrelevant because the conditions neces-
sary to it—a strong uniform seasonal convention as to when
advance orders are placed and incentive to smooth seasonal
patterns in output by producing or shipping in slack times if
orders are on hand—are not fulfilled.
output, but in this case we find a clear tendency for
amplitude to be greater at the earlier stage and for
turns to precede turns in shoe output; stocks of leather,
raw and in process, strongly reflect these differential
rates of input and output.
Thus, though the large majority of receipts of leather
depends on requirements for the current output of
finished leather goods, at least half of the subcycical
variability in receipts of leather is associated with
fluctuations in leather stocks (unprocessed and in-
process) rather than directly with fluctuations in fin-
ished output. The fluctuations in stocks are, in absolute
terms, little greater for heavy swings in output than
for the shorter, often lighter, swings. Stocks rise and
fall, on the average, synchronously with subcycles in
production; first differences in stocks lead the turns
in trade.
I have tried to study how this pattern comes about,
for it has important implications for the dynamics of
business fluctuation. Its explanation involves the whole
range of practices bearing on the association between
buying and selling; no more limited study is useful.
Businessmen have a great deal to contribute concern-
ing what these practices are. But when one under-
takes further specification and test of the hypotheses
with the aid of time series, a dilemma appears. Theo-
retically, we require information on selling, buying,
and ownership position; actually we possess statistics
on output, receipts, and stocks of leather on hand.
Fortunately the two sets of information are not without
some relationship to one another, both logically and
temporally. By exploiting this relation, it seems possi-
ble to make some progress. The behavior of the time
series at our command add specificity to the hypothesis
and appear consistent with it, though not uniquely so.
-Byand large, the earlier turns and a good part of
the amplitude of inventory investment, especially of
the shorter movements, seem to be associated with
shifting prospects as to prices and other conditions in
leather markets rather than with the physical require-
ments of producing a changing number of shoes. Cer-
tainly more leather is suspended in the receiving and
production process when sales are high than when
they are low, but neither total stocks nor increments
and decrements need to be proportional to the level
or rate of change in output. The ability to speed up
the movement of materials through the factory and
into the factory, on the basis of foreknowledge of
requirements, means that the connection between the
level of output and the size of stocks can be quite
loose if operating efficiency is the only consideration.
Further, shoe manufacturers' descriptions of their
procedures do not reveal the same sort of carefully
constructed inventory objectives for leather as applyMANUFACTURERS' BUYING—2
to retailers' model stocks of shoes. Ambiguous, loosely
held intentions mean that the term unintended change
in stocks is an anomaly. Consequently, the stock-
objective accelerating mechanism described earlier is
not likely to operate here. Indeed, since it derives pri-
marily from the inability to validate intentions,it
would not be present for a second reason: a large
amount of sales of shoes are made several months
ahead of when they must be delivered, and in time to
permit leather to be acquired specially for the purpose.
As a result, shoe manufacturers do not have to make
the errors in gauging leather buying that the retailer
(who ships the same day he receives the order from his
customer, but often buys several months ahead) must
make.
But the successful operation of a shoe factory does
seem to imply that a larger proportion of expected
or actual leather requirements be bought sooner some-
times than other times. To some extent this is merely
a reflection of parallel shifts in the shoe buying of
retailers or wholesalers. But it seems inevitable that
shoe manufacturers add to the fluctuation in meeting
the exigencies of their own business problems. The
resulting increase and decrease in leather stock on
hand and on order is visible, too, in stock on hand only.
We have tried to examine the variables affecting the
process.
They can be discussed at many levels, and this is
one reason why they are so difficult to discuss at all.
At the level closest to actual buying, the changes in
prospects concerning the speed with which deliveries
can be relied upon, concerning adequacy of selec-
tions, concerning future prices are, for the shoe manu-
facturer as for the retailer, the primary considerations
(though price expectations may play a more impor-
tant part in connection with the buying of leather
than of shoes).
For each of these problems, especially problems in-
volving buying prices, actual expectations—in the
sense of some sort of probability distribution—is only
part of the picture, for the assurance with which ex-
pectations are held (the level, as well as the shape,
of the distribution) and the risk attached to action
on the basis of a given expectation, held with a given
degree of assurance, are very important, too. Any
effort to separate the three elements—expected prices,
certainty, and risk—is fraught with peril. The neces-
sarily crude evidence that we have been able to ex-
amine seems to insist on the importance of the less
obvious second and third elements. We see a close
temporal association between leather stocks and the
factor that seems to represent the snowballing of mar-
ket sentiment. We see also reflections of the temporal
patterns in risk, and its effect on investment, in the
limits within which the output-stock ratio seems to.
fluctuate.
Dropping to the next level of analysis—the factors
that determine expectations, risk, and assurance—.
complications multiply. We have not tried to catalogue.
systematically the factors on which expectations about
prices rest, though we shall try to summarize observa-.
tions appearing here and elsewhere in Chapter 15.
In general, two major classes of factors have come to.
the fore—those that intensify change in a given direc-.
tion and those that tend to limit and reverse change.
In the first group belongs the tendency for men
togain confidence only slowly.
The process is intensified by the fact that man is a
social animal and gains confidence in his thinking
when others think similarly and act accordingly. What
others do, as well as think, adds to the cumulative
process in other ways: it can change the situation
with which each man must deal. Thus for any one man,
the incentive to buy ahead is stronger, ceteris paribus,
when enough competitors are buying ahead so that
costs for a substantial segment of the industry, and
therefore prices, are predicated on early buying. An-
other important cumulative factor is the tendency
for expectations to result in actions that tend to vali-
date expectations: the expectation that prices will
rise augments buying; this raises prices. The circle
of cause and effect harasses empirical study, since
the change in hide prices that might be a guide to,
and reflection of, expectations could likewise be sig-
nificantly shaped by the shift in inventory position
that these expectations touch off.
But our studies hint that there may well be a dis-.
ciplined dialectic to these short swings that give them
a true capacity to reverse themselves. We seem to find,
factors—on the basis of what logic suggests, business-.
men say, and the statistics at least pass as credible—.
that cause both extension and contraction of
position eventually to push against increasing resist-.
ance. For the shoe manufacturer, the size of stocks
provides one such limit; though it may be less sharpS
than for the retailer, it seems likely that the trade
holds certain notions concerning the maximum num-.
her of weeks' supply of various sorts of leathers
may properly be held on hand and on order under
optimistic and under pessimistic market prospects. It-
seems probable, too, that these limits, however elastic.
they may be, are revealed in the ceiling and floor to
output-stock ratios that we saw in the figures.
factor tending toward reversal may well operate.
through its impact on expectations about prices—.the.
limits that businessmen impose on the tolerable in-.
verse movement of unit margins which results of neces-
sity from inflexible selling prices and flexible buying-174 CHAPTER 12
prices. Finally, the tendency that we have observed
again and again for acceleration to cease several
months before the absolute turns—acceleration in
prices and orders, which could in the latter case carry
implications concerning unfilled orders, too—may also
have some impact on business thinking.
All in all, the poking and puttering in the variety
of information that could be assembled dimly out-
lines a process of great subtlety and even beauty.
Built out of the intimate details of business practice—
the picture differs significantly for shoe retailer, whole-
saler, and manufacturer—it has nevertheless the delib-
erateutlines of an apparatus that has the power to
intensify and yet eventually to reverse the course
of change. In the tanning industry to which we now
turn, there appears yet another variation on this theme.